Details
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Bug
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Status: Closed (View Workflow)
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P2
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Resolution: Done
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None
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CP: sprint 115
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2
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Core: Platform
Description
Impact
An attacker can use this vulnerability to aid in social engineering attacks. The most common use would be to create highly believable phishing attacks.
Description
The application will redirect users to an arbitrary URL specified by the RelayState query parameter. This is often used to bring users back to a previous page when they authenticate to an application or to pass single sign-on information to a third-party application. This value can be controlled by an attacker and the application will redirect a user to any value set for the parameter.
A typical attack would involve sending legitimate users an email requesting them to click a link related to the application. This link would embed the redirect URL and would ultimately take the victim to an attacker-controlled login page that looks similar to the application’s login page. The attacker could then harvest the victim’s credentials and silently authenticate them to the application without the victim realizing an attack occurred.
Furthermore, the application embeds the resulting JWT in the ssoToken query parameter. This sensitive information could be leaked to third-parties and attackers due to the arbitrary URL redirection vulnerability. For instance, an attacker can force an admin to initiate a SP- initiated login flow, providing an attacker-controlled server as the value of the RelayState. Since there’s no URL validation done on the FOLIO application, it then sends the final JWT to the attacker-controlled server. This can be potentially exploited to steal tokens from higher- privileged users of the application.
Repro steps
1. Log in with a user to the application via SSO.
2. Using a web-intercepting proxy tool such as Burp Suite, intercept the POST request to
the https://okapi-bugfest.folio.ebsco.com/_/invoke/tenant/fs00001000/saml/callback and
copy the value of SAMLResponse parameter.
3. Save the contents below to a local file with a .html extension, substituting the value of
SAMLResponse HTML element with the value copied from the previous step.
4. Open the file in a browser and click the submit button. Observe the redirection to ncc-
group.com domain.
<html> <body>
<script>history.pushState('', '', '/')</script>
<form action="https://okapi-bugfest.folio.ebsco.com/_/invoke/tenant/fs0000100
0/saml/callback" method="POST">
<input type="hidden" name="SAMLResponse" value="" />
<input type="hidden" name="RelayState" value="https://nccgroup&
#46;com/" />
<input type="submit" value="Submit request" />
</form> </body>
</html>
TestRail: Results
Attachments
Issue Links
- blocks
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FOLIO-2524 Security Audit raised issues
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- Open
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MODLOGSAML-65
Create mod-login-saml security release
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- Closed
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- is blocked by
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MODLOGSAML-63
Implement CSRF Prevention
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- Closed
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OKAPI-847
Conditionally defer CORS handling to module when invoked via passthrough API
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- Closed
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- Closed
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STCOR-544
Set credentials: include on fetch to /saml/login
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- Closed
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- relates to
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- Closed
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- mentioned in
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